Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has ended the post-Cold War European security order, creating new realities in countries neighbouring the EU and shattering illusions in several member states about the Kremlin’s true intentions in wider Europe. By granting candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and a European perspective to Georgia, the EU has rejected a Russian sphere of influence and instead determined where its future borders should lie. But this decision has not yet led to policies tailored to effectively respond to a geopolitical context which also sees China and other state actors competing for influence. The Eastern Partnership still needs to be fitted with security and connectivity components. In the accession process, existing formats had already reached their limits with, inter alia, the obstructionism by certain member states that is linked to the divisive issue of EU internal reform. This has cost the EU a lot of credibility in the Western Balkans and will take years to resolve. REUNIR, a project with 12 partners from across Europe, examines how the EU can strengthen its foreign and security toolboxes to bolster the resilience and transformation of (potential) candidate countries in a new age of international relations. REUNIR’s foresight approach takes the fundamental uncertainty and openness of alternative futures seriously. Adding the effects of ‘protean power’ unleashed in unforeseen circumstances to a multi-disciplinary approach to the research of the EU’s ‘control power’ in relations with strategic rivals, REUNIR empirically assesses foreign threats to the military, socio-economic and democratic resilience of 9 neighbouring countries, determines capability shortfalls, maps local perceptions of the EU’s support and political perspectives inside the EU on neighbourhood relations. Outlining scenarios up to 2035, REUNIR offers evidence-based policy recommendations to mitigate malign foreign interference and strengthen the EU’s external action.

Two risks characterize the European Union’s (EU) regional and global security environments, 1) areas of limited statehood (ALS) in the EU’s East and South, in which central government authorities are too weak to enforce rules and/or do not control the monopoly over the means of violence; 2) contested orders (CO), in which various actors challenge the rules according to which societies and political systems are and should be organized. EU-LISTCO will investigate, first, under which conditions ALS/CO deteriorate into governance breakdown and violent conflict, turning risks into security threats for Europe. By combining risk scanning and foresight methodologies with comparative case studies, we will identify the tipping points at which risks turn into threats, and how they might be better anticipated. We will also investigate how global and diffuse threats affect tipping points as well as the sources of resilience in ALS/CO that can be leveraged from the outside. Second, EU-LISTCO will investigate how the preparedness of the EU and its member states can be strengthened to anticipate, prevent, and respond to threats of governance breakdown and violent conflict and to foster resilience in ALS/CO. In particular, we will examine the strategies, capacities, and policy instruments of EU institutions and selected member states, with a focus on the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the implementation of the EU Global Strategy. A new methodology for knowledge exchange between academia and foreign policy will assist EU-LISTCO to achieve its policy objectives. EU-LISTCO encompasses a unique consortium of universities and think tanks in close cooperation with the European External Action Service as well as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany, and Italy. This knowledge exchange will take place continuously allowing scholars to incorporate concrete policy challenges in their research and enabling policy practitioners to pursue research-based policies.

D.Rad grounds radicalisation in perceptions of injustice which lead to grievance, alienation and polarisation. Based on a rigorous, cross-national survey of the drivers (injustice, grievance, alienation, polarisation) that can generate violent extremism, it uses innovative machine learning, discourse analysis and social psychology approaches to test projects, tools and dissemination strategies, emphasising the experiences of young people and socially excluded communities, and offering policy and practical recommendations. It will meet challenges posed for radicalisation research by developing online and offline interventions to promote agency, resolution and resilience. D.Rad will benefit from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. This will involve three core objectives, supplemented by secondary aims: 1. Detect Trends: D.Rad aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, especially in the emerging context of everyday polarisation over mundane issue in micro-spatial environments, in order to base interventions in evidence grounded in contemporary data and methodologies. 2. Resolve Drivers: D.Rad aims to understand the online and offline drivers that turn grievance, alienation and polarisation into radicalisation, so that policies can more effectively target underlying problems of social exclusion. 3. Re-integration and Inclusion: D.Rad aims to understand how individuals affected by grievance, alienation and polarisation can be re-integrated into the established polity or social groups, without compromising personal or collective liberties.