Internet bans and asset freezes are examples of anti-terrorism measures employed by governments to constrain individuals without making use of jail sentences. The increased use of such measures and the impact of them on individual liberty and autonomy raises the following question that has not been addressed in philosophy of law: Should the employment of anti-terrorism measures that deprive individuals of their liberty outside the prison cell be accompanied by legal safeguards similar to the safeguards assigned to individuals subjected to incarceration? This question needs to be addressed if one wants to assess existing anti-terrorism measures or propose new ones. The task of this interdisciplinary project is to set guidelines for how individual liberty and autonomy can be secured by law in times of terrorism. It aims to rethink anti-terrorism measures from a normative perspective and provides a framework to consider amending them. This philosophical basis may function as a justificatory framework for contemporary practices, which will be beneficial for legal scholars and policy makers. It is essential to conduct this project at Rutgers University’s Institute for Law and Philosophy because this will provide me with the best network in the field and supervision from leading scholar Douglas Husak.