Cybercrime has become a crucial issue for citizens (faced with pishing, hacking), companies (ransomware, data theft) and States. Among these new types of crime and fraud, criminals often use crypto assets to benefit from the anonymity provided by these private contracts. Consequently, in order to respond to the European project, we will endeavour to understand cybercrime, in particular through frauds and swindles on crypto assets but also the use of these contracts for the payment of cybercrimes and the transfer of dirty money between countries. The analysis of these cybercrimes will be the starting point of this research, by approaching cybercrime both in its qualitative dimensions through an in-depth socio-economic expertise of significant cases and in more quantitative approaches using classifications on data collected and processed by computer. The presence in the consortium of members of the police and judicial authorities will make it possible to have access to specific cases. These cases will be analysed by the partners involved (academics and experts involved in the fight) in order to bring out the salient facts about the computer processes used (faulty security protocols, malicious programmes and codes, weaknesses in network security, cryptographic flaws), the intermediaries used (their location, legal personality, function, reputation/anonymity) and the methods of payment (category of crypto assets, passage through tax havens). From this collaborative work, deliverables may emerge that meet a dual requirement: academic excellence and effectiveness in the field of the fight against cybercrime. Finally, this co-production will be part of the eco-system established by Cluster 3 of the Horizon2023 project. The consortium formed will take care to establish links with the projects already underway, in particular the one aimed at understanding the causes of crime. Among the partners, Finance Innovation is a partner in a Horizon 2020 project dedicated to cryptoassets (Infinitech). But more than that, it aims to link up with the 2024 wave, which targets crypto-currencies more directly. The originality of the CRY-CIDER project will therefore be to build, within the European framework, a double collaborative work between (1) the actors of the fight against cybercrime (police and judicial authorities) and the academics involved, and (2) between academic disciplines (computer science, humanities and social sciences). The combination of these complementary European expertise will allow to meet the expectations of the European project: 1) the development of a modular platform to inform, detect, investigate and qualify cyber-crimes, particularly those involving crypt asset; 2) the construction of training modules intended primarily for members of the police and judicial authorities but also for students, users and citizens; 3) the definition of regulatory recommendations and best practices.

For decades, public policies have been concerned about women’s sexual health both at the international and the national level. Sexual health is usually defined as “a state of physical, emotional, mental and social well-being in relation to sexuality, and not merely the absence of disease, dysfunction or infirmity” (World Health Organization). Difficulties of access to sexual healthcare are frequently reported by French women and sexual healthcare status and consumption are still largely explained by socio-economic characteristics. In France, sexual healthcare can be provided by gynaecologists, general practitioners (GPs) and midwifes. The characteristics of these health professionals have strongly evolved since the early 2000s, especially with a drop in the number of gynaecologists and the increasing skills of midwifes in gynaecological follow-up out of pregnancy. This project will evaluate the effects of the changes in the supply of sexual healthcare on the professional practices and on healthcare use by women. We will first provide a typology of territories according to the characteristics of the supply and demand in sexual healthcare (WP1). We will then analyse the evolution of professional activities (volume, composition and coordination with other professionals) depending on where practitioners are practising (WP2). Finally, we will analyse the evolution of sexual healthcare use in relationship with the evolution of the supply. In each WP, we will combine a qualitative approach (interviews) with a quantitative analysis (using survey or administrative data) thanks to the skills of our pluridisciplinary team (economics, midwifery, geographic, sociology).

Sharing a damage that has been caused by several individuals is a difficult problem that courts often face. Even if there exist basic principles and rules to apportion damages among them (like for instance in the third Restatement of Torts promulgated in May 1999 for the United-States), legal scholars are still looking for a systematic method. Many examples of such litigation come to mind: a car driver hurts a pedestrian and breaks his or her leg. Then, the victim is taken to a hospital to be looked after but, because of the fault of the surgeon, he or she completely loses the use of his or her leg and gets amputated. Apportionment rule is needed to correctly share the damage paid by each tortfeasors. Such litigations occur as soon as two or more individuals have jointly caused damages and it is easy to think about the different fields of law concerned by this issue: environmental law and nuisance, accident law, medical malpractices, products liability, victim contributions, securities law, antitrust etc. The aim of the paper is to reconsider the issue of apportionment among multiple tortfeasors to expose some economic principles which could be applied by the judiciary in order to rationally share the damages due by each tortfeasor. But contrary to many models in law and economics, we do not use a non-cooperative game approach. In the following, damage is modeled as a cooperative game where different agents – the tortfeasors – jointly create an indivisible economic loss, the damage. The DAMAGE project aims at showing how the cooperative approach may bring useful insights into legal questions. The main issue we address in this project is the following. We use cooperative game approach as a model to evaluate the causal role of each tortfeasor. Our aim is to build a set of structured games which fit with the main cases of multiple causation (successive injury, victim’s fault, joint damage etc.) and to solve these games with usual solution concepts used in cooperative game theory. Then we will study the consequences of such apportion rules on the incentives followed by the tortfeasors. This main issue leads to two others issues. The first one is to know whether cooperative game approach is consistent with contemporary counterfactual theories of causation. The second one is to study whether the French jurisdictions practices (mainly civil courts) are enlightened by our approach. We will proceed to an empirical study by building an original data set on the main French courts decisions on this topic. And this date base will finally be open to legal scholars, judges and lawyers.

For a long time the indissoluble nature of marriage and the gender distribution of social roles was met by payment of (lifetime) alimony after the divorce : the man had to provide an income for his ex-wife, independently of the amounts paid for bringing up their shared children. In France, this legal model was partially abandoned in 1975 with the setting up of a “compensatory allowance”. This meant, instead of a paying a maintenance allowance, making a payment of capital which was supposed to compensate for the disparity in standards of living at the time of separation and for the foreseeable future. This law did not however put an end to lifetime allowances and it was followed by a series of reforms aimed at both encouraging capital payments and limiting the accepted amounts. This movement is evidence of the idea of formal equality between spouses and strengthens the principle of a “single settlement” at the time of the divorce. The time of “unmarriage” is now established, but not that of the equality of the sexes : in parallel with greater participation of women in the employment market and the decline in the fertility rate, we know that investment in domestic activities and the children’s upbringing, the advancement of both professional careers and incomes for men and women remain very different. However, whilst the social conditions for its payment seem still to exist, a compensatory allowance is rarely claimed during divorce proceedings and only 12.5% of divorce decisions include one, in parallel with a constant decrease in the amounts granted. Moreover, the criteria for decision given to judges by the Civil Code remain ambiguous and still fluctuate between the principle of alimony (ensuring the ex-wife minimum resources) and that of compensation or benefit (compensating for the wife’s loss of earnings linked to her domestic investment to the detriment of her professional investment). Consequently, it is not possible from the decisions rendered to understand the principles determining the amount of compensatory allowances. We therefore seek to know the determinants for the judge in allocating an amount, and in particular, whether or not they are linked to the existence of such inequality in the couple, given that practitioners are starting to use “scales” whose criteria remain implicit. Bringing together researchers in law, economics and sociology with practitioners (judges, lawyers), this project aims to investigate the theoretical, empirical and political basis of the payment of such an allowance. It further proposes to scientifically analyse how the practitioners (lawyers, trial court judges, appellate court judges) confront contradictions and ambiguities when they have to make a decision granting and fixing the amount of a compensatory allowance. Finally, from the findings of the preceding analyses, the project’s ambition is to design a decision-making tool to assist in fixing the amount of a compensatory allowance (scale) which can be proposed to the Ministry of Justice.

Although France and Germany are similar in many socio-economic dimensions, their total fertility rates are at the opposite extremes of the spectrum found in the OECD. German family policy has sought to increase the low rate for years with little success. We believe that much can be learned from a systematic comparison that is guided by economic theory, features detailed modeling of family policy and labor market environments alike, and adequately controls for heterogeneity in preferences. In the proposed project, we develop an estimable life cycle model with endogenous fertility, career, and labor supply decisions. The model is fully forward-looking, so women choose their careers based on their desired fertility level and the costs of career breaks. These costs are shaped by policy through the prices of childcare, maternity leave benefits, and birth-related job protection policies. They are also influenced by the choice of career itself: Foregone returns to experience and human capital depreciation vary with the task baskets associated with different types of jobs. Our model includes the decision to obtain a university degree; in order to get a meaningful distinction between different career paths we develop a task based approach. Heterogeneous preferences for education, work and fertility ensure that we do not falsely attribute differences in outcomes to variation in the institutional setting. We perform extensive model checks, including validation on holdout samples. Estimating comparable versions of the model for Germany and France allows us to decompose differences in outcomes into differences in policy, the labor market environment, and preferences. We are also able to investigate possible interaction effects between these three sets of explanatory factors. We also use the model to study specific family policy measures in greater detail. Our main application will be the 2007 reform of parental leave benefits in Germany. Unlike the existing quasi-experimental studies, the structural model will allow us to quantify the separate effects of the different components of the reform, to isolate the reform effects from concomitant changes such as the expansion of childcare, and to predict the long-run fertility effects of the reform, distinguishing changes in completed fertility from pure timing effects. We will also use the model to simulate changes to the current system of parental leave regulations and to approximate the efficient frontier of fertility and female labor force participation, while leaving total fiscal cost constant at the present level.